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NOTES
manufactured or tested but is not liable for the breach of an
implied warranty to such persons. The breach of warranty
theory has been applied only in cases involving deleterious food
products and, even then, the liability for such does not extend to
a donee of a remote vendee. Thus the liability of a manufacturer
or vendor of chattels extends to a larger class of persons than
the manufacturer of food products but the latter is held more
strictly accountable to those to whom his liability does extend. It
would seem that the extent of liability should be the same in
both cases. RossE- MORRISS
LIABILITY OF A RADIO STATION FOR DEFAMATORY
UTTERANCES
I. THE: PIw I EM
Within the last quarter century radio has become our most
extensive and influential system of mass communication. In the
light of such growth, it becomes increasingly important for the
judiciary or the legislature to clear up the current confusion
with a consistent theory of liability for defamation propagated
through the facilities of a radio station. When the same prob-
lems arise in the television field, their judicial determination, in
the absence of controlling legislation, will be upon the precedents
established in the radio cases.1
Our problem may be simply stated. A broadcasting company
leases or donates radio time to one who makes defamatory state-
ments which are heard by a large listening audience. The broad-
casting company is not aware of the fact that defamatory utter-
ances were to be made. Is the broadcasting company liable in
the absence of negligence, and if not how specifically ought we
to define negligence in such a situation?
If we are to operate within the general framework of the
existing common law of defamation it would seem that our an-
swer will depend upon our treatment of the broadcasting com-
pany:
1. As of January 1, 1949, the F. C. C. had authorized 2,127 standard
radio stations, 964 F. M. stations, and 214 television stations in the
continental United States. Chet Thomas, Brass Tacks, St. Louis Adver-
tising Club, Feb. 14, 1949.
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1. as an original publisher of the defamatory matter and so
absolutely liable even in the absence of any intent to make
a defamatory utterance or of any negligence, 2 or
2. as a secondary disseminator of the defamatory material-
one who has no intent to defame and no reason to know
of the defamatory nature of the material-liable only for
negligence.3
Each of these bases has received recognition by the American
Law Institute4 in appropriate situations. The policy of not un-
duly hampering commercial intercourse appears to be the only
justifiable basis for selecting the second alternative. No one
would think it economically justifiable nor feasible to impose
absolute liability upon the corner newsboy for a libel appearing
upon the inside page of the paper he hawks. This principle has
been extended to newsvendors,5 booksellers,O telephone and tele-
graph companies, 7 libraries," the proprietors of public halls, and
to newspapers to the extent that the publication is in the form of
"canned" news (A. P., I. N. S., and U. P. releases) , while news-
papers other than in the "canned" news situation, ° marketing
specialists,11 and laymen who repeat defamatory statements1 2 are
2. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 577 (1938).
3. Id. § 581. Compare this with § 578 and 580. The term "disseminator,"
as it shall hereafter be used in this discussion, shall refer to the legal
recognition of a secondary disseminator only, not an initial propagator.
4. But, more specifically, see RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 581, comment f(1938), which contains the following: "f. Radio Broadcasting. The pro-
prietors of a radio broadcasting station are at least liable under circum-
stances which would make a disseminator of defamatory matter liable
under the rule stated in this Section, that is, if they fail to exercise
reasonable care to prevent the publication of defamatory matter. TheCaveat to §577 raises the question, on which the Institute takes no position,
as to whether such persons are not further liable as original publishers
under the rule stated in that Section." The Caveat to §577, at p. 196,
sets forth: "Caveat: The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the
proprietors of a radio broadcasting station are relieved from liability for
a defamatory broadcast by a person not in their employ if they could nothave prevented the publication by the exercise of reasonable care, or
whether, as an original publisher, they are liable irrespective of the pre-
cautions taken to prevent the defamatory publication."
5. Weldon v. "The Times" Book Company, 28 T. L. R. 143 (C. A. 1911);
Emmens v. Pottle, 16 Q. B. D. 354 (1885); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 581,
comment c (1938).
6. Vizetelly v. Mudie's Select Library, [1900] 2 Q. B. 170; Martin et
uz. v. Trustees of the British Museum, 10 T. L. R. 338 (1894); RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 581, comment d (1938).
7. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 581, comment e (1938).
8. Id., comment d.
9. See Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933).





regarded as publishers and held absolutely liable. The publica-
tion is complete with a communication to a third person, and
courts have given the fullest possible scope to that term.13 Even
a republisher will be subject to the same absolute liability as the
original propagator.14 It would seem, then, that our problem
becomes whether, on the basis of public policy, the broadcasting
company should be held absolutely liable as a publisher or liable
only for negligence as a disseminator.
It is important to note at this point that certain' assumptions
are implicit in this discussion: (1) that an unprivileged defama-
tion has been uttered, 5 so that the plaintiff would have a cause
of action against the actual speaker; and (2) that the actual
speaker is not the agent of the broadcasting company, in which
case the latter would be clearly liable as an intentional tort
feasor under the respondeat superior doctrine. 6 Furthermore,
the problem of whether this type of tort should be classified as
libel or slander, a problem which has provoked much discussion,
is without the scope of this note. We shall assume that a tort
sui generis17--having characteristics of both libel and slander-
has been committed.
II. PROBLEMS PECULIAR TO RADIO
It has been said that the casual listener to a radio broadcast
listens passively to the program and, having no reason to doubt
the truth of what he hears, accepts the statements made as true.
It has also been pointed out that radio audiences have no way of
knowing whether the words are part of a prepared script edited
13. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 577 (1938).
14. See Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191 (1931).
15. Complex problems as to privilege arise under the few Federal
statutes relating to radio liability for political broadcasts, and the prohi-
bitions against censoring such type of broadcast. Such problems are out-
side the purview of this discussion. See Communications Act of 1934, 48
STAT. 1088 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 315 (1946), as well as the proposed White
Bill, SEN. REP. No. 1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), 94 Cong. Rec. 7738
(June 9, 1948). Also see RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 578, comment b (1938):
"The republication of a libelous article, being a separate publication, may
make the publisher liable although the original publisher is protected by a
privilege. On the other hand, the republication of a libel may be privi-
leged although the original publication was unprivileged."
16. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 577, comment e (1938).
17. Meyer, Radio Defamation: Neither Fish Nor Fowl, 2 The Lawyer
and Law Notes 7 (1947-1948) for the view that radio defamation should
constitute a new tort which would recognize the peculiarities of the broad-
caster's position. SOCOLAW, LAW OF RADIO BROADCASTING 466 (1939); Note,
104 A. L. R. 877 (1936).
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by the broadcasting company, or are interpolated remarks, or
ofttimes, whether the station actually approves, tacitly or other-
wise, of the statements which are made. Because of the fact
that the injury to the plaintiff would appear to be the same in
any of the above situations, some writers have argued that differ-
ent bases for liability varying with the manner in which the
defamation arises are not justifiable and that one consistent
theory of liability should obtain in all cases.18 The cases demon-
strate that different bases of liability have evolved in the varying
fact situations in spite of the fact that the harm to the plaintiff
may be as great in one case as in another, and that the listener
is not in a position to detect the degree of responsibility of the
broadcasting company. In general, tort liability under our sys-
tem of law is predicated on blameworthiness,19 and variations
in liability in spite of the equal degree of harm to the individual
prevail in other fields of the law. Blameworthiness should not
be excluded here.
The following distinctive fact situations may arise:
1) the defamation appears in a prepared script which is
not ddited;
2) the defamation is an extemporaneous deviation
a) from a prepared script, previously edited, or
b) from a prepared script, not previously edited;
3) the defamation occurs on a totally extemporaneous pro-
gram (e. g., man-on-the-street broadcast).
The leading case of Sorenson v. Wood,20 which falls into (1)
above, was decided by the Supreme Court of Nebraska in 1932.
Station KFAB in Lincoln offered its services to defendant, Wood,
to make a political broadcast. The slanderous matter was printed
in a written script which the station might have obtained, but
did not, before the broadcast. Although the slander continued
for several minutes, defendant-station did not use the mechani-
cal means available to shut defendant-Wood off the air. The
Nebraska court, after having considered such factors as the size
of the publication and the impossibility of retraction, found the
18. Donnelly, Defamation by Radio: A Reconsideration, 34 IowA L. REv.
12, 26 (1948), where he says: "The distinction between defamatory words
read from a manuscript and tose interpolated is just as fictitious in deter-
mining the basis of liability as it is in classifying the words as libel or
slander. The harm to the plaintiff is as great in either situation and the
listener is not in a position to detect the form the words take."
19. Justice Holmes has said: "The law does, in general, determine lia-
bility by blameworthiness." HoLms, THn CoMmox LAw 108 (1881).
20. Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932).
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broadcasting company absolutely liable, and based its decision
upon this theory:
The defendant company, like most radio broadcasters, is to
a large extent egaged in the business of commercial adver-
tising for pay. It may be assumed this is sufficient, not only
to carry its necessarily large overhead, but to make at least
a fair return on its investment. For it appears that the
opportunities are so attractive to investors that the available
airways would be greatly overcrowded by broadcasting sta-
tions were it not for restrictions of the number of licensees
under federal authority. Such commercial advertising is
strongly competitive with newspaper advertising because it
performs a similar office between those having wares to ad-
vertise and those who are potential users of those wares.
It competes with newspapers, magazines, and publications of
every nature. The fundamental principles of the law in-
volved in publication by a newspaper and by a radio station
seem to be alike. There is no legal reason why one would be
favored over another nor why a broadcasting station should
be granted special favors as against one who may be a
victim of a libelous publication. 21
The Sorenson case drew an immediate wave of comment from
legal writers, not all of it adverse.2 2 The precedent was followed
the next year in Miles v. Louis Wasmer, 17., 3 a Washington
case. Defendant-broadcasting station was held absolutely liable
under a closely analogous set of facts, the outstanding distinction
being that the defamatory matter was of briefer duration. This
court also placed considerable reliance upon the law relating to
newspaper defamations.
A considerable body of opinion arose subsequent to these de-
cisions advocating the reduction of the station's liability to that
of a disseminator. Admitting that a high degree of care was
essential, these critics pointed out the large degree of social
utility attributable to radio, predicted eventual injustice in cases
involving extemporaneous utterances, and questioned the validity
of the analogy to newspaper defamations.2 4 They succeeded in
21. Id. at 357, 243 N. W. at 85.
22. Void, Defamatory Interpolations in Radio Broadcasts, 88 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 256 (1940), where he voices accusations that the chief critics of
the Sorenson doctrine were counsel for the large broadcasting corporations,
that their motives were selfish, and that all arguments now directed to the
courts were raised in the Sorenson case and "properly" determined there.
23. Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P. 2d 847 (1933).
24. See Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 725, 729-31
(1937); Haley, Law on Radio Programs, 5 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 157, 187
(1937); Keller, Federal Control Defamation by Radio, 12 NOTRE DAME
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
raising sufficient doubt so as to prevent the American Law In-
stitute from taking any but a neutral position, and the Caveat
to Section 577 was adopted25 although no cases prior to that date
other than those finding absolute liability can be located.
In 1934, the Federal District Court for the Western District of
Missouri followed the absolute liability principle in Coffey v.
Midland Broadcasting Company.2' The defamation involved ap-
peared in a prepared script, properly ratified and rehearsed by
the Columbia Broadcasting System. The broadcast originated in
New York and was sent via a telephonic connection to Kansas
City, Missouri, where it automatically was transmitted by the
local outlet, Station KMBC. The Remington-Rand Corporation,
sponsors of the program; the Columbia Broadcasting System,
and KMBC were made parties-defendant. A demurrer to the
complaint by KMBC was overruled. The court found absolute
liability against all three defendants, stating that the irreparable
nature of the damage and the size of the publication were con-
trolling factors. A judicial suggestion that advertising rates
might be raised to cover such "inevitable" defamations was ad-
vanced 27
It would seem that reliance on the cases discussed supra was
unnecessary here, at least insofar as defendant-Columbia Broad-
casting system was concerned. The System authorized the defa-
mation and thus became liable as an intentional tort-feasor.28
Although defendant-KMBC could only be held liable on absolute
liability grounds, it should be noted that as an agent of the net-
work the local outlet, if it were forced to pay, would have an
action over against its principal, the Columbia Broadcasting
System, on simple agency grounds. Thus the rule is not so harsh
when applied under these circumstances.
LAW, 15 (1936), 12 NOTRE DAME LAW, 134, 151-162 (1937); Guider, Lia,
bility for Defanation in Political Broadcasts, 2 J. RADIO L. 708, 713
(1932); Nash, Application of the Law of Libel and Slander, 17 OR. L.
REV. 307, 309 (1938); Note, 14 ORE. L. REV. 492 (1935); Sprague, Free-
dom of the Air, 8 AIR L. REV. 30 (1937) Note, 8 So. CALIF. L. REV. 359
(1935); Farnum, Radio Defamation and the A. L. 1., 16 B. U. L. REv. 1
(1935); Note, 12 ORE. L. REV. 149 (1933); 2 SocoLAw, LAW OF RADIO
BROADCASTING 858 (1939); DAVIS, LAW OF RADIO COMMUNICATION 163-164
(1927); Report of Standing Committee on Communication, 57 A. B. A.
REP. 423, 445-446 (1932).
25. See note 4 supra. See Farnum, supra note 24.
26. Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W. D. Mo.
1934).
27. Id. at 891.
28. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 876-877 (1939).
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With the decision in Summit Hotel Company v. National
Broadcasting Company,2 9 an entirely new theory as to the lia-
bility of a broadcaster was introduced. Generally, the case fits
within classification 2a.30 The National Broadcasting Company
leased radio time to the J. Walter Thompson Advertising Corpo-
ration, which paid all the entertainers for a series of programs;
the advertising corporation was in turn paid by a commercial
sponsor. The script was submitted to the broadcasting network
and approved. On one of the broadcasts, an entertainer was
interviewing a golf champion and when the latter mentioned he
had once been employed by the plaintiff, the entertainer rejected
"That's a lousy hotel." The remark was entirely outside the
script; there was no way defendant-broadcasting company could
have prevented it. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed
the decisions noted supra and then found for the defendant-
broadcasting company, saying:
A broadcasting company that leases its time and facilities
to another, whose agents carry on the program, is not liable
for an interjected defamatory remark where it appears that
it exercised due care in the selection of the lessee, and, hav-
ing inspected and edited the script, had no reason to believe
an extemporaneous defamatory remark would be made.
Where the broadcasting station's employee or agent makes
the defamatory remark, it is liable, unless the remarks are
privileged and there is no malice. 3'
The court also refuted the analogy to defamatory remarks
published in a newspaper, finding that theories hitherto used in
other fields were being misapplied to radio broadcasts. The de-
cision represented a very substantial contraction of the broad
basis of liability enunciated in the Sorenson case, supra.
The court in the Summit Hotel case did leave assurance of ade-
quate redress for failure to censor a prepared script. Much
emphasis was placed on the extemporaneous nature of the re-
mark, and it seems logical to assume the Pennsylvania court
would find failure to eliminate defamatory matter from a script
negligence as a matter of law. Thus failure to edit would leave
the broadcaster in the same position as defendant in the Sorenson
case.
29. 336 Pa. 182, 8 A. 2d 302 (1939).
30. See infra.
31. Summit Hotel v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 204, 8
A. 2d 302, 312 (1939).
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The switch in emphasis from careful guarding of the plain-
tiff's rights to one of sympathy for the difficult situation of the
defendant embodied by the rationale of this case stimulated
further academic discussion. Critics of the new theory were
quick to arise, and with virtual unanimity they pointed out that
Pennsylvania in no case upheld the doctrine of absolute liability
for a tort. The court in its decision had carefully indicated that
the affirmative inspection of the script was the reason for its
decision. Yet most observers felt the case had repudiated the
Sorenson doctrine. The Summit Hotel rationale received some
further judicial support in New York several years later when a
trial court followed the reasoning (although without citing the
Pennsylvania decision) in Josephson v. Kniokerbocker Broad-
casting Company.32
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey gave full con-
sideration to the different theories of liability in the third leading
case on radio defamation, Kelly v. Hoffman,3 3 decided in Septem-
ber, 1948. Plaintiff, a public official of the city of Trenton,
brought an action against defendant-announcer, an employee of
the Trenton Publishing Company; defendant-publishing com-
pany, lessee of the time on the air; and the Trent Broadcasting
Corporation, owner of Station WTTM, over which the broadcast
was transmitted. Upon motion of the last-named defendant, the
trial court struck out the third count of the complaint (the one
against the station) as failing to state a cause of action, and
plaintiff appealed. The appellate court discussed the problem of
whether the station's liability should be predicated on that of a
publisher or a disseminator, and concluded:
(a) .... radio broadcasting company which leased its facili-
ties is not liable for a defamatory statement during a radio
broadcast by the person hired by the lessees and not in the
employ of the radio broadcasting company, the words being
carried to the radio listeners by its facilities, if it could not
have prevented publication by the exercise of reason care.34
have prevented publication by the exercise of reasonable
care.
34
Nevertheless, since it was felt that non-performance of the duty
of reasonable care was available to the plaintiff within its com-
plaint, the order of trial court was reversed.
32. 179 Misc. 787, 38 N. Y. Supp. 2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942).




The principle authority relied on was a discourse upon abso-
lute liability as an archaic theory in modern society, Professor
Bohlen's Fifty Years of Torts,3 in which he argues that radio
should be, like a bookseller, liable only as a disseminator; that
the station need only take reasonable care to see that no scandal-
monger takes advantages of its facilities to preach defamation.3 6
What are duties imposed by the courts and the ends achieved
thereby? It must be noted that the amount of litigation has been
surprisingly small when the vast amount of broadcast time is
considered. The high standards of the Federal Communications
Commission, and the early doctrine of liability without fault,
may share the credit for this. Self-police measures have been
effective. In almost all cases, stations are careful to scrutinize
scripts; in general, the broadcasters have lived up to the high
obligation to the public which they shouldered when they were
granted franchises to broadcast.
Continuation of this situation is most desirable. Censorship
has three functions: first, it enables the station to delete defama-
tory matter in the script; second, it serves as a check on certain
attitudes of the script-writer which cause him to use phrases
whose import approach defamation; last, it calls the attention of
the person using the air time, whether lessee or donee, to the
gravity of the consequences of any defamatory statements.
It may seem short-sighted categorically to state that previous
censorship should be the lone criterion in determining whether
35. Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REv. 725, 729-731 (1937).
36. The New Jersey Court was also greatly influenced by the Summit
Hotel decision where the court said: "Against the few exceptional situa-
tions in which absolute liability may have been applied, stands the great
weight of modern authority that no man should be held liable for an
unintentional injury resulting from the performance of a lawful act with-
out negligence or wilful misconduct." 8 A. 2d, 306. The court further
noted Professor Ames' quotation: "The ethical standard or reasonable
conduct has replaced the unmoral standard of acting at one's peril." 8
A. 2d, 307, note 10. To statements such as these, Professor Vold in
Defamatory Interpolations in Radio Broadcasts, 88 U. OF PA. L. REV. 249,
281, says that the deep-seated underlying conception that justice and public
policy require that as a general rule there should be no liability without
fault is a fallacious assumption which is not true in other fields of torts
and which disregards the victim of those torts. Also, "So far as under-
lying considerations of policy are concerned, should the courts now yield
to the arguments in behalf of radio stations and substitute some variant
of the law of negligence for the strict liability for defamation which is
applicable as a matter of course to other publishing enterprises, they
would be taking a very conspicuous step backward." Vold, supra note 36,
at 285.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
a radio broadcaster has sufficiently instructed its user as to his
duties while on the air. Nevertheless, censorship is the most
effective means of deterring future careless remarks, as well as
preventing present defamation. A radio station has a high de-
gree of public responsibility by the terms of its franchise; it
must in turn see to it that the responsibilities are understood by
those to whom it grants the privilege of use. This cannot be
done when the program is purely extemporaneous in nature. In
all other cases, an analogy can be drawn to compulsory agency,
and liability determined accordingly. Thus the broadcasting com-
pany owes a fiduciary duty to the public to inform its lessee or
donee of his obligation to the publice.3 Therefore the station
should escape liability only when it can prove (by sustaining a
heavy burden 38 ) that the user acted flagrantly outside the scope
of the privilege previously explained.
It may be argued that the duty to explain is met by the "save
them harmless" clause commonly found in contracts between a
broadcasting station and a lessee. A typical provision was that
found in the contract in the Summit Hotel case, infra:
Except as otherwise herein expressly provided, the Adver-
tising Agency will save the company harmless against all
liability for libel, slander, unfair competition, infringement
of trademarks, trade names or program titles, violation of
rights of privacy, and infringement of copyrights and pro-
prietary rights and all other liability to third parties result-
ing from the broadcasting of the programs herein provided
for.3 9
The clause does serve to indicate in some measure the possibility
of harm to the lessee, but it is submitted it does not sufficiently
reveal the gravity of possible error. The actual speaker has no
knowledge of specific contract terms. Even if he had, such knowl-
37. See Seitz, Responsibility of Radio Stations for Extemporaneous
Defamations, 24 lWARQ. L. REV. 117 (1940), where he contends the broad-
casting corporation is in a position similar to an automobile owner who
lends his car to another. By statute, the consent of the owner is inferred
in every action of the driver except for an intentional wrongdoing. Seitz
maintains that the analogy should apply to broadcasting companies, who
give consent to the sponsor of the radio show to use the company's appa-
ratus, and such consent is implied in every action except intentional torts.
He concludes by saying absolute liability is just in all situations except
extemporaneous defamations.
38. Disseminators must sustain the burden of proving that they had no
reason to know of the defamatory character of the matter they republished.
RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 581, comment o (1938).
39. Vold, Defamatory Interpolations in Radio Broadcasts, 8 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 249, note 48 (1940).
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edge would nevertheless be ineffective as compared to constant
deletions by a vigilant censor.
If the speaker were to defame a third person intentionally
(perhaps by reading words previously deleted), a different situ-
ation is involved. It would seem that in such a case, criminal
action against the speaker would be a more effective, and just,
solution.
The result reached in the Summit Hotel case is a sound one.
According to the rationale, either malicious intent or reckless
statements by the speaker will absolve the broadcasting station.
These are personal manifestations of prejudice arising after the
lessee had been informed of his obligations through censorship.
The entire script had been ratified by the National Broadcasting
Company. The lessee and his employee had had experience in
radio programs. The remarks made defamed the plaintiff in
spite of the use of every reasonable precaution by the defendant
in seeing that the lessee and its servant understood their re-
sponsibilities.
Following this reasoning, a station should be held liable when
an extemporaneous defamatory remark is interjected and the
station has failed to censor the script. Legalistically, the diffi-
culty would seem to be that the causal relation between tort and
injury is insufficient. However, failure to censor has resulted in
the increased possibility of future defamation, for the user has
not been made aware of his obligations; there has been a neglect
of duty. Since the station has failed to do all that it reasonably
should have to prevent the defamation, the causal relation be-
tween the neglect and the injury is sufficient to satisfy modern
theories of tort law.
The Sorensou and Miles cases, infra, reached a good result,
but might better have been decided on a negligence theory. There
was present a failure on the part of the defendants to censor a
prepared script and also a possible failure to stop the transmis-
sion when the defamation became evident. The defamed plain-
tiff should not be forced to leave the question of liability in the
hands of a jury; sufficient redress can be given only if it is
determined that failure to edit a script by a broadcasting com-
pany or station constitutes negligence as a, matter of law. Pro-
tection of the public requires a directed verdict when the de-
fendant fails to sustain the burden of proof as to censorship.
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In the case of the extemporaneous program, social policy de-
mands that different rules govern. Both the broadcasting com-
pany and the lessee of the time know that many unreliable people
will be given the broadcasting facilities for a brief period. Dam-
age is foreseeable. Since the station assumed the risk of per-
mitting the use by irresponsible participants, it should be liable
for defamation caused by this informal broadcast (which the
station uses to attract listeners). If the public must bear the
loss through increased advertising rates, this does not seem un-
just when the position of the injured party is considered.
The most recent case, Kelly v. Hoffman,40 reaches a result
different from the Sorens& case, although the pleadings allege
facts which seem to be quite similar. The case merely decided
that the plaintiff's petition would stand as against a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, but in reversing the
trial court, the appellate court stated that defendant-broadcast-
ing station can be held liable only if it has failed to exercise
"ordinary care." There is no mention of finding the station-
owner negligent as a matter of law had the station failed to
censor the material. Thus it seems that the New Jersey court
decided the case without realizing the soundness of the results
which had been reached in previous adjudications.
III. STATUTORY INFLUENCE
Although no state has adopted statutes which embrace all
aspects of the radio defamation problem, there has been some
evidence of attempts to protect the stations from absolute lia-
bility. Washington1 and FloridaW2 provide for non-liability when
the speaker departs from a prepared script. The Florida statute,
which carefully requires editing by the station, states:
The owner, lessee, licensee or operator of a radio broad-
casting station shall have the right, but shall not be com-
pelled to require the submission of a written copy of any
statement intended to be broadcast over such station twenty-
four hours before the time of the intended broadcast thereof;
and when such owner, lessee, licensee or operator has so re-
quired the submission of such copy, such owner, lessee,
licensee or operator shall not be liable in damages for any
libelous or slanderous utterance made by or for the person
40. 61 A. 2d 143 (N. J. 1948).
41. WASH. RsV. STAT. ANN. § 998-1 (Rem. Supp. 1943).
42. FLA. STAT. § 770.03 (1941).
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or party submitting a copy of such proposed broadcast which
is not contained in such copy; but this section shall not be
construed to relieve the person or party, or the agents or
servants of such person or party making any such libelous
or slanderous utterance from liability therefor.43
Such an enactment is a sound codification of the rationale of the
Summit Hotel decision.
California," Indiana,45 North Carolina,46 and Canada47 have
adopted retraction laws which permit the defendant to escape
liability by retracting on later broadcast. Plaintiff must give five
days notice before bringing suit and if the defamation was with-
out malicious intent, the station can retract by means of another
broadcast at the same hour and be liable only for those damages
plaintiff can specifically prove.
Oregon 4l and Iowa"9 make the exercise of due care by any
party a good defense. No cases have as yet been decided which
indicate what the meaning of "due care" may be; the duties of
the broadcaster are not set out.
IV. CONCLUSION
The basic duty of the broadcasting company is to edit and
censor a prepared script whenever possible. Censorship is the
only effective means of eliminating defamation in a prepared
script and deterring future defamations by making those who
have the opportunity to broadcast conscious of the responsibili-
ties involved. The proof of the effectiveness of the censorship
imposed to date is the extreme rarity of litigation which has
resulted. There is no need for a theory of absolute liability; the
predication of liability upon a negligence theory will give satis-
factory results in all instances. As a matter of law, however,
proof of the failure to edit a prepared script is negligence, en-
titling the plaintiff to a directed verdict.
Despite the apparent confusion as to theory of liability in the
litigated cases, the results reached have been sound. The oppor-
43. Ibid.
44. CALIF. CIV. CODE § 48 a (1941).
45. IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-518 (Burns 1933).
46. N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99-2 b (1943).
47. Canadian Defamation Act. Manitoba Laws c. 11, § 16(1), 17(1);
Alberta c. 14 (1947). For a brief discussion see Wright, The Law of Torts,
26 CAN. B. Rsv. 46, 91 (1948).
48. Ore. Laws 1941, c. 303.
49. IowA CoD § 659.5 (1946).
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